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ABSTRACT: The effectiveness of technical analysis has been debated by investors for years.
This paper provides an overview of the history of technical analysis and details the more
common techniques used in technical analysis. The relationship between technical analysis
and fundamental analysis is discussed as well as how both methods of analysis are
reconciled with the efficient market hypothesis.
After introducing the more common tools of technical analysis, several of these are
applied to Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index covering the last ten years. Several technical
analysis techniques outperform a buy and hold strategy by significant margins.
Among the methods used to analyze the S&P index are a 150-day moving average,
the behavior of average bond yields, the Barron's Confidence Index, and short interest ratios.
The returns provided from each method were calculated and adjusted to annual compound
rates of return. All methods were examined from 7/1/83 to 6/30/93, and compared to a buy
and hold strategy over the same period.
In 1970 Richard Dennis borrowed $1600 from his family. He spent $1200 to
purchase a seat on the Midwest Stock Exchange (now the Chicago Stock Exchange) and
begin trading with the remaining $400. By 1988 Richard Dennis was worth an estimated
$200 million.
Mark Weinstein entered a Chicago Board Option Exchange trading contest and
turned $100,000 into $900,000 in three months. He claims to have never had a losing week
as a trader since 1980.
Ed Seykota, an electrical engineering graduate from MIT, developed the first large-
scale commercial computer trading system. He began managing money for clients in the
early 1970s. One of his actual customer accounts started at $5000 in 1972 and has made
over $15 million.
What do these individuals have in common besides their remarkable abilities to make
money in the financial markets? They each rely strictly on technical analysis to guide their
trades.
The analysis of financial markets is divided into two \I~ di v~dodcamps - technical
analysis and fundamental analysis. Although nearly all major brokerage firms and
investment services employ technical analysts, the field is still often held in contempt by the
traditional fundamentalists who make up the majority of analysts. Technicians are often
regarded in the same manner as those using astrology or the length of women's hemlines to
predict the market.
Technical analysis has been gaining in popularity recently, especially since the stock
market correction (or crash, depending on how much money you had invested at the time) of
October 1987. Despite increasing acceptance, it remains a largely misunderstood method of
analysis. Despite the extraordinary success of the above traders, there is still considerable
debate about the effectiveness of technical analysis in predicting market movements. This
paper will examine some of the most common tools used by technical analysts, their
justifications, and then apply some of these techniques to major market indicators over the
past ten years.
Before examining different technical techniques, we should first take a brief look at
the history and basic concepts of the different theories involved in forecasting financial
markets.
The Fundamentals of Fundamental Analysis
The fundamental investor believes that the underlying value of a company or
commodity can be found through extensiveanalysisof economicconditions,projected sales,
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projected earnings and dividends, competition, managerial ability, plant capacity, crop
forecasts, and many other related measures. After thoroughly evaluating all available
information, the fundamentalist predicts the future performance of the company or
commodity and assigns a value to it The fundamentalist believes that prices often diverge
from underlying value, but eventually return to their intrinsic value. Thus if a stock is
trading below its true value, the fundamentalist buys it because he knows it will increase in
price as it moves to reflect its true value.
The bible of fundamental analysis is Security Analysis, the 778-page tome by
Benjamin Graham and David Dodd which was fIrst published in 1934. Benjamin Graham
was a very successful portfolio manager, earning $600,000 in 1928, and then keeping his
clients afloat during the crash of 1929. Graham and Dodd stressed the rigorous evaluation of
a company over a seven to ten year period to determine its earning power. The four major
components of stock evaluation were expected future earnings, expected future dividends,
the value of expected earnings, and asset value. They used numerous financial ratios to
determine a ftrm's [mancial strength and performance. Graham and Dodd also devoted 175
pages to accounting methods, understanding well the ability of accountants to manipulate
earnings.
The basic ideas of fundamental analysis could be applied to individual companies,
industries, or the overall market. To estimate the value of a stock market series one needs to
estimate expected earnings per share (EPS) and estimate an earnings multiplier. To estimate
expected EPS, one estimates gross national product, estimates sales per share, estimates
operating profit margin, estimates depreciation expense, estimates interest expense, and
estimates the tax rate. To arrive at an estimated earnings multiplier, one estimates investors'
required rate of return, estimates the growth rate of dividends, and then estimates the
dividend payout ratio. Each of these estimates can be broken down further into the estimates
required to derive these estimates, but it should be obvious that there can be a tremendous
margin for error.
The analysis of a company's stock would use the same basic format, estimating EPS
and an appropriate multiplier. Again this is no easy task. Just last month, the Big Three auto
makers released their third quarter earnings for 1993. The actual earnings differed from
analysts' consensus estimates by a range of 36% for GM to 240% for Ford. The respected
Value Line Investment Survey predicted Ford would post a 5~ per share loss when Ford
actually earned 51~, and Lehman Brothers projected GM would lose 85~ per share when
they only lost 30~. The fact that professionals can miscalculate earnings by such a wide
margin analyzing an industry with as much available information as the auto industry,
highlights the difftculties of fundamental analysis.
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3The Technical Approach
Technical analysis in its purest form involves simply studying price and volume
movements. The technician believes that by charting past behavior of a stock or commodity
one can predict future price movements. The technician looks for trends and recognizable
patterns in price movements with absolutely no regard to underlying financial or economic
conditions. A technician sees no value in fundamental analysis, believing not only that there
is far too much margin for error in the plethora of assumptions, but also that all fundamental
expectations are already built into the market price. According to technical analysts, since
investors are always trying anticipate the future, prices change before fundamental
information becomes widely available. Therefore, prices can actually be used to predict
fundamentals, not vice versa. This idea can be supported by the fact that the National
Bureau of Economic Research uses stock prices as one of its twelve leading indicators to
forecast economic activity.
Although fundamentalists point to their extensive use of complex economic,
accounting, and statistical concepts to demonstrate the validity of their methods and their
reliance on accepted economic theory, technicians believe their method of analysis employs
the most basic of all economic laws - the law of supply and demand. Technicians see that,
at the most basic level, what drives up the price of a stock is increased demand. What causes
this demand is unimportant to the technician, only the ability to spot trends and trend
reversals matters.
Just as fundamentalists tend to look down on the technician's neglect of underlying
value, technicians scorn fundamentalists for relying completely on quantifiable aspects of the
market while neglecting all non-statistical areas. As John Magee, often considered the dean
of technical analysts, wrote with Robert Edwards in Technical Analysis of Stock Trends:
The market price reflects not only the differing value opinions of many
orthodox security appraisers but also all the hopes and fears and guesses and
moods, rational and irrational, of hundreds of potential buyers and sellers, as
well as their needs and their resources-in total, factors which defy analysis
and for which no statistics are obtainable, but which are nevertheless all
synthesized, weighed and finally expressed in the one precise figure at which
a buyer and seller get together and make a deal.
Most technicians seem more likely to discuss psychology than accounting and more
likely to quote from Gustave Le Bon's The Crowd than Graham and Dodd's SecurUy
Analysis. Sociology and psychology, particularly concerning crowd behavior, are seen as
extremely important factors affecting supply and demand which are not considered by
fundamentalists. As Magee stated, the market is affected by both rational and irrational
4forces that drive supply and demand. Technicians believe that these non-quantifiable and
possibly irrational factors will certainly never be found no matter how much fundamental
company analysis is done and can only be seen in price movements.
The basic tenants of technical analysis were summarized by Magee and Edwards as
follows:
1. The market value of a security is determined solely by the
interaction of supply and demand.
2. Supply and demand are governed at any given moment by many
hundred factors... No ordinary man can hope to grasp and weigh them all,
but the market does this automatically.
3. Disregarding minor fluctuations, prices move in trends which
persist for an appreciable length of time.
4. Changes in trend, which represent an important shift in the balance
between supply and demand, however caused, are detectable sooner or later
in the action of the market itself.
A Random Walk Toward Efficient Markets
Into the fray between technical analysis and fundamental analysis we must add one
more theory of financial market activity originally known as the random walk theory but
now known mainly as the efficient market hypothesis. The random walk theory developed
originally from empirical data involving tests of technical analysis. These tests showed no
statistically relevant effect of one price movement on the next price movement. According
to the random walk theory, price movements are completely independent of previous
movements, so there is no way to earn an excess return by analyzing only past price data.
The random walk theory has been often misunderstood. All that it says is that short
term price changes are independent of previous prices. It does not say that price levels are
random, only short term price changes. The theory does allow for long term trends to
develop and since it assumes all past information is built into the stock price, an investor
with superior information will still profit in the market. On the other hand, it does
completely dismiss technical analysis as a market forecasting technique that belongs
somewhere between studying sunspots and reading tea leaves.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, several studies were done showing that the
performance of professional money managers was not significantly better than the overall
market and sometimes noticeably worse. Michael Jensen examined 115 mutual funds
between 1945 and 1964 and found that only 43 outperformed the market as a whole after
adjusting for risk and commissions. A similar study by William Sharpe found that only 11 of
34 funds outperformed the Dow Jones Industrial Average- An extensive study by Friend,
Blume and Crockett studied 136 funds from 1960 to 1968. They found an average annual
return on the funds of 10.7% while the New York Stock Exchange averaged 12.4% annually
over the same period.
These studies provided a challenge for academicians and fundamentalists to explain.
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showing such poor results from mutual funds struck directly at the fundamentalists who
made up the vast majority of fund managers. In 1970, Eugene Fama produced the first major
published effort detailing the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). In its strongest form the
EMH states that stock prices fully reflect all information available and, over time, give an
investor a fair return according to the risk of a particular stock. According to the EMH it is
highly unlikely that an investor will beat an overall market average over sufficient time.
Of course few money managers believe in the strong form of the EMH. After all, if
they did there would be no need for their continued employment. There would also seem to
/1be sufficient examples of money managers who earn consistently higher than expected ,
returns, as well as a few with consistently lower returns (which also contradicts the EMH). (i~
Many strict fundamentalists such as George Soros and Warren Buffet have consistently
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outperformed the market by margins that can never be explained by the EMH. There are ~.
l/even enough technicians, such as those mentioned at the beginning of this paper, who are G
consistently outperforming the market that we are forced to believe technical analysis has
worked for at least a few people.
The idea that a monkey trained to throw darts at the Wall Street Journal should
perform as well as an Ivy-League MBA will always be vehemently opposed as long as Ivy-
League MBAs are paid six figure salaries to perform as well as dart throwing monkeys.
Other long-time market analysts just laugh about the idea of markets being efficient. As
David Dreman quotes one unnamed market observer after watching Disney stock fall 86
percent between 1972 and 1974, "When was the market efficient?" he wondered. "When it
took Disney up to 119 or when it took it back to 16?"
Although all forms of the EMH refute the ability of a technical analyst to outperform
the market, many technicians use the underlying principles of the EMH to support their
positions. They argue that today when there are more mutual funds than stocks listed on the
New York Stock Exchange and thousands of analysts examining every industry, it is
impossible to have an informational edge over the market without illegal insider information.
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Technicians agree with the strong-fonn EMH in that all infonnation is immediately incorporated
into the stock price. All relevant information, even insider information, is already built into the
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'Ii .A y'lt.L. '(IU ldc"'- <. fA..\... f't:..VI'r tt'-< }01As mentioned before, the random w~ lheory c me about after empirical tests showed no
relationship between price movements. Since then many tests have been conducted of simple
technical systems. The results of statistical tests conducted with technical trading systems remain
inconclusive to this day. Robert Levy conducted tests which showed significantly better
performance from a "relative strength" trading rule than a buy-and-hold strategy, however
subsequent tests by Jensen and Bennington indicate that after adjusting for risk and transaction
costs, no advantage exists. Other tests have shown returns slightly above what was expected from
random movement, and some systems showed absolutely no results outside of a statistically
accepted random range. Technicians dispute the studies, saying that the tests were too simplistic,
that they used few variables, or did not properly simulate a technical trader in real life. There are
probably some truths to these arguments. Technicians combine many different indicators to signal
buying or selling opportunities. Traders also combine their trading rules with instinct, intuition, and
other factors they themselves may not be able to adequately explain.
The Tools of Technical Analysis
Today, a wide range of loosely defined trading rules and philosophies have come under the
umbrella heading of technical analysis. These rules can be generally divided into three areas:
market structure, sentiment, and flow-of-funds indicators. Market structure indicators show the
trend of the market. The belief that markets move in recognizable trends is at the core of technical
analysis. By watching the relationship between charted prices, volume, and whether different
indexes move together or not, technicians hope to recognize familiar patterns that would signify
whether a trend will continue or is ready to reverse. Most technicians believe that a divergence in
the movement of different indexes or between price and volume indicates an imminent reversal of
the trend pattern.
The best way to literally see market structure indicators is by looking at stock charts.
Technicians are often called chartists due to their extensive examinations of these charts. In fact,
Magee stated that an accomplished technical analyst could "interpret the chart of a stock whose
name he does not know... completely ignorant of the company, the industry, what it manufactures or
sells, or how it is capitalized." The language of technical analysis is fIlled with references to the
patterns seen in their charts. Divergence, convergence, support, resistance, flags, pennants, head-
and-shoulders, and channels take on great importance to the technician. These terms will be
covered briefly in this paper.
Sentiment indicators are widely used by technicians to predict market peaks. Technicians




contrarian move), believing that the higher the percentage of optimistic investors, the higher
the chances of a market decline and vice-versa. This goes back to the interest in psychology
and crowd behavior. Most technicians believe that advisory services, fund managers, and the
general public usually become most pessimistic just as a bear market is starting to reverse,
and usually don't jump on the bull market bandwagon until the market is near its peak.
The flow-of-funds refers to the availability of money for the market, both from the
demand side and the supply side. Many technicians study the trends in mutual fund cash
positions, pension funds and other major institutional investors to attempt to measure the
amount of potential demand. They may also examine the number of new offerings and the
amount of margin debt to get a better feel for potential supply. Many technicians also study
the amount of short selling activity. This is used both as a contrary opinion indicator (the
belief that short selling peaks when the market is at or near a bottom) and as a flow-of-funds
indicator, since anyone selling short must eventually buy back the security.
r1-ttl,
These three main areas of technical analysis have developed many branches over the..." )~ ~,<
years. One of the key beliefs of most technical analysts today seems to be, if it works, use it. \->
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)'1Technicians are generally unconcerned with how or why an indicator works, as long as it
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appears to get results. When technicians do seem sure about why their indicators work, it
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often involves simplistic descriptions of crowd behavior and investor psychology. As Joseph~)lv y
V..G\ IiGranville, an extremely influential technician, explains why a stock will meet "resistance" at~\ r
/'a certainprice: t-</
What a stock does follows a clearly defined line of logic. There is a
very simple and fundamental reason why a stock advances after making an
upside penetration of a previous high and declines after moving down from a
high of $75 a share. When the stock rebounds to 75, all those who first
bought the stock at 75 will be anxious to move out, glad to be even after
previously racking up temporary paper losses. Perfectly logical.
Suddenly the technicians who think fundamental analysis involves too many inexact
estimates, understand the behavior and situation of every single investor. Other technicians
seem fond of comparing stock price movements to natural phenomenon such as ocean tides
although no indication is given as to why a stock price should emulate nature anymore than
nature should emulate stock movements.
The Evolution of Technical Analysis
Dow Theory
Charles H. Dow was the founder of the Dow-Jones financial news service and is
7
generally credited with inventing stock market averages. The Dow theory is based on Dow's
writings up to his death in 1902. At that time William P. Hamilton, who succeeded Dow as
editor of the Wall Street Journal, organized DOW'Swork and published the principles of the
Dow theory in The Stock Market Barometer in 1922. Although the theory is widely regarded
as the fIrst technical theory, it should be noted that Dow was a fIrm believer in the idea that
stock prices were ultimately determined by earnings, and meant his work to be only a guide
to general business trends, not a method of market forecasting.
The Dow theory is concerned with determining major trends in the market based on
the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DnA) and the Dow Jones Transportation Average (the
Dow Jones Rail Average during DOW'Stime). ~~Thetheory assumes that a trend, once
,
established, will continue until a reversal i~ed. Although it has been criticized as being
to slow to detect trend reversals, the Dow theory is still employed by many technicians, and
is the basis for many other technical trading theories.
The basic principles of the Dow theory are:
1. The Averages Discount everything. Long before the EMH, Dow believed that
since the averages reflected the combined judgement of thousands of investors, they
discounted everything that could possibly affect the supply of and demand for securities.
Even natural disasters were quickly discounted by the averages.
2. There are three major trends in the market: primary, secondary, and minor.
Primary trends usually last for a year or more and are generally known as a bull (rising
trend) or bear (falling trend) market. Secondary trends are corrective movements in the
opposite direction of the primary trend. Minor trends are daily fluctuations (perhaps the
random walk component) and are disregarded by the Dow theory.
3. Primary up trends usually have three up moves with two secondary down
movements. The first wave is attributed to far-sighted investors picking up cheap stocks
after all bad news has been discounted. Overall economic conditions may still be poor at
this time. The second up wave occurs as improving business conditions are announced. The
fmal wave comes from overconfidence and speculation.
4. Primary down trends are also made up of three main movements with two
secondary up moves. Again, the fIrst wave is credited to far-sighted investors who recognize
that the market is overpriced. The second wave develops due to the panic of other investors
who fInally recognize the business downturn. The final wave is the result of distress selling
regardless of underlying value.
5. Secondary trends normally last from three weeks to a few months. They nonnally
retrace form one third to two thirds of the last primary wave. According to Magee,
recognizing the secondary movement is the most difficult aspect of applying the Dow theory.
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6. The two averages must confirm each other. That is, both the DJIA and the
Transportation Average must both signal the same trend to be a valid signal.
7. Volume goes up with the trend. This means that trading volume tends to increase
as prices move in the direction of the primary trend. This rule is used only as background
information to aid decisions if other information is difficult to interpret.
8. Only closing prices are used. Intraday fluctuations are assumed to be averaged
into the final trading price.
9. A trend is assumed to remain in effect until its reversal has been definitely
signaled.
As mentioned, the Dow theory is often criticized for not giving a buy (or sell) signal
until the market has already make a large up (or down) movement. Nevertheless, several
studies have shown the effectiveness of the theory. Richard Durant applied the Dow theory
to the sixty year period from 1897, when a bull market was signaled, to 1956. During this
period the theory gave fifteen buy and fifteen sell signals. If an investor would have
invested $100 in the 30 stocks of the DJIA on July 12, 1897 when the average was 44.61 and
followed the Dow theory signals, in 1956 the investment would have grown to $11,236.65
excluding dividends. A buy and hold strategy would have seen the $100 investment grow to
only $1,757.93.
A similar test run by Martin Pring from 1897 to 1990 showed an average gain in the
price of the DnA of 38% after buy signals, and an average gain of 10% if the investor would
have sold short after each sell signal. Although Pring is quick to point out the difficulty of
interpreting all signals, and that his decisions were made with the benefit of hindsight, he
still believes that there is little doubt that the theory does work. Of course, as Pring alludes
to, it is easier to predict the past than the future. Predictive power is the true test of any
market analysis tool.
Business Cycle Theories
It has loct.l~be~ recognized that general economic conditions move in cycles of
expansion and retractio .' Likewise, many believe the stock market moves in similar cycles
usually preceding e business cycle. Attempts to standardize these cycles date back to Sir
William Herschel's essay "The Nature of the Sun." In 1875 William Stanley Jevons
proposed a theory relating sunspot activity to economic conditions. Actually, at this time
when society was mainly agrarian, sunspots may have played a major role in farmers' crop
output and the overall economy.
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Russian economist Nikolai Kondratieff published several major works detailing 50-
to 54-year economic cycles in the Western world. A 50- to 52- year cycle of prices has been
demonstrated in the United Kingdom since the year 1271. Kondratieff's work pointed to
major economic declines following peaks in commodity prices in the 1820s, 1870s, and
1920s. His writings in the early 1920s correctly predicted the economic decline beginning in
1929 and the upswing in the 1960s. However, the Kondratieff wave theory called for a
major downturn in the early to mid 1980s, which should make one either discount the theory
or extremely nervous.
Several recent theories are based on a series of numbers known as the Fibonacci
Sequence, which was originally published in 1202 by the Italian mathematician Leonardo
Fibonacci as the solution to a problem about the reproductive capabilities of rabbits. The
number sequence starts with 1,1,2,3,5,8,13 and continues by adding the previous number in
the series to the present number. One of the unique characteristics of the series is that the
ratio of successive numbers is approximately 1.618 and the reciprocal .612. This series has
been noted in areas of nature, such as the way branches on a tree increase each year or the
number of bumps on a pineapple and the petals of a sunflower. It would seem to require
quite a stretch to connect the bumps on a pineapple to the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
R. N. Elliot used the Fibonacci Sequence as the basis of the Elliot Wave Principle
fIrst published in articles in 1939. Elliot suggested that the stock market moved forward in a
series on five waves and then declined in a series of three waves. Elliot noted major stock
market waves and then continued dividing waves further and further into Fibonacci numbers.
Although highly subjective, there are many Elliot Wave theorists practicing this art and more
often than not, disagreeing constantly about the proper interpretation of price movements.
Other cycle theories have fallen in and out of favor over time as well. Clement
Juglar noted an 8 to 10 year economic cycle which also became known as the Decennial
Pattern, signifying 9.25 year patterns in stock prices. Joseph Kitchin wrote of 4-year cycles
in wholesale prices and interest rates in the 1920s. Others have proposed shorter cycles as
well, but all cycle analysis is highly subjective and complex.
Price Patterns
At the heart of technical analysis is the belief that known price patterns can be
recognized and that these patterns can be used to predict future movements. While
technicians believe that prices move in trends, they also believe that these trends take some
time to reverse. Analogies with speeding cars and trains are commonly used to explain why
the market must slow down, come to a full stop, and then reverse direction. The ability to
spot what Magee calls "reversal formations" is the true goal of technical analysis.
10
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Support and Resistance
Most price patterns are based in some way on the theory of support prices and
resistance prices. According to Magee:
A support level is a price level at which sufficient demand for a stock
appears to halt a down trend temporarily at least, and possibly reverse it... A
resistance zone, by the same token is a price level at which sufficient supply
of a stock is forthcoming to stop, and possibly turn back, its up trend.
The support and resistance levels represent boundaries that the stock tends to stay between
for some period of time. A breakthrough of either of these boundaries is seen as a strong
reversal signal. Most technicians believe that the longer a stock stays within a certain
trading zone, the more dramatic its eventual breakout will be. Volume is also considered in
evaluating support and resistance breakouts - the more volume increases with the trend, the
stronger the signal.
Support and resistance levels need not be static. Since stocks move in trends, support
and resistance levels are assumed to move in trends with prices. As seen in Figures 1 and 2,
support and resistance lines can be drawn when prices are trending or are fairly stable. The
main indicator that technicians look for is a penetration of a support or resistance line. An
upward breakout of a resistance line is seen as a buy or bullish signal, while a downward
breakout is a sell signal.
Of course, looking at historic charts and drawing lines to represent support and
resistance, is far simpler than examining a current chart and trying to determine whether a
stock has just broken through a resistance line. Magee suggests that when volume is
greatest, the resistance is strongest. Also the greater the distance between support and
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Figure 2. Support and resistance for upward trend.
Head-and-Shoulders Formation
The head-and-shoulders pattern is one of the most frequently cited examples of a
resistance breakthrough. It gets its name from the pattern which roughly resembles (usually
very roughly) a silhouette of a person's head and shoulders. In a perfect head-and-shoulders
example, price will move up on high volume before falling back to the support level. It will
then advance further, but on less volume and decline to the support level before rising once
again to the fIrst peak. It will then decline below the support level. Figure 3 shows an ideal
head and shoulders pattern.
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Head-and-shoulders patterns may be inverted as well, with the peaks going
downward. Many technicians place great importance on this pattern, and some technicians
believe the distance from the neckline to the head indicates how much the price will move
when it does breakout past the neckline. Figures 4 and 5 show instances over the last two
years when the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 composite index could be described as in a
head-and-shoulders pattern and the price then moves below the neckline by approximately
the same distance as from the head to neckline. But again, attempting to identify this pattern
is a highly subjective endeavor.
Identifying a head-and-shoulders pattern can be difficult when looking at historic
data, much less continuous real-time charts. The fact that it relies so much on an analyst's
judgement makes it extremely difficult to test. The chart from 1991 in Figure 6 looks very
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Figure 4. Head-and-shoulders example.
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Figure 7. Symmetrical triangle pattern
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Figure 6. Head-and-shoulders with price increase after brief neckline breakout
Investing or Geometry?
Beyond the head-and-shoulders pattern, technicians place importance on a variety of
geometric shapes observed in price charts. Technical Analysis of Stock Trends includes
sections on triangles, rectangles, wedges, flags, pennants, and diamonds to name a few. The
most common of these is the symmetrical triangle which is an acute triangle drawn when
price fluctuations become smaller so that the lines of the triangle will eventually come












Generally triangles are seen as lines of resistance or support and if the price breaks
out above the line it is viewed as a buy signal and a downward breakout is a sell signal.
Most technicians caution against too much faith being put in triangle formations. Triangles
are often difficult to detect at the time, and they are never believed to predict the actual
direction of a future breakout. Martin Pring warns that "a great deal of caution should be
used when evaluating these elusive patterns. "
Trendlines
One of the underlying tenets of technical analysis is the idea that prices do move in
identifiable trends. Drawing lines along the lowest points of an up trend or the highest
points of a down trend provide the technician with a simple method of telling if a trend is
slowing or reversing. Indeed one of the most interesting aspects of technical analysis is how
often one can look at historic data and draw lines that are touched several times by the lower
or upper extremes of a price series. The chart in Figure 8 on the following page illustrates
this technique applied to the S&P 500 composite index for 1992.
Once again, it is much easier to go back and draw trendlines on historic data than to
try to decide where one trendline begins and another ends on current data. Even if we do
establish trendlines, the experts agree that the meaning of a penetration is not always clear.
As Martin Pring notes in Technical Analysis Explained, "The penetration of a trendline will
result in either a reversal of that trend or its continuation." What could be more valuable than
an indicator that tells us the price will go either up or down?
Most technicians do, however, put much faith in trendlines. They are easy to draw, if
not always easy to understand. Importance is placed on the length of a trendline, the angle,
and the number of times prices touch the line. The greater the length and the more gradual
its ascent or descent, the greater the importance placed on its penetration. Also the more
times a trendline is tested but not broken contributes to the strength of the trend. This is
taken to indicate a stronger level of support or resistance, and is more significant when
eventually broken.
Moving Averages
Another method used by technicians to determine the direction and strength of a
trend is the moving average. A simple moving average is taken by summing a series of
prices including the ~resent ~rice and dividing by the number of observations. Some
technicians will also use a weighted moving average which places more weight on the most
recent prices. Either type of moving average acts to smooth the general trend from sharp
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Moving averages are applied in several different ways. Some technicians look for a
change in the direction of the average itself, while others view a crossover of a moving
average as a buy or sell signal. Still other technical analysts examine how far above or
below its moving average the market is, assuming the market will return to its moving
average.
Joseph Granville summarized his strategy for using a 200-day moving average with
the following buy signals:
1. If the 200-day average line flattens out following a previous decline, or is
advancing, and the price of the stock penetrates that average line on the
upside.
2. If the price of the stock falls below the 200-day moving average price
while the average line is still rising.
3. 1£the stock -pricefalls too fast under the declining 200-day average line.
And the following sell signals:
1. If the 200-day average line flattens out following a previous rise, or is
declining, and the price of the stock penetrates that line on the down side.
2. If the price of the stock rises above the 200-day moving average price line
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Figure9. S&P 500 composite with 150-day moving average crossovers.
while the average line is still falling.
3. If the stock price is below the 200-day line and is advancing toward that
line, fails to go through and starts to turn down again.
4. If the stock price advances too fast above the advancing 200-day average
line.
The most common length of time to evaluate in building a moving average seems to
be either 150 or 200 days. It is believed that a 30 to 40 week average will sufficiently
smooth out daily or even weekly fluctuations, which random-walk theorists might even call
random price movements.
The moving average is another simple-to-compute, easy-to-read technical indicator
used in some form by most technicians. An illustration of a 150-day moving average line
along with daily activity of the S&P 500 composite for the five year period from 1988 to








At one time technical investors had little information to work with except price and
volume. Magee and Edwards concentrate almost exclusively on charting these two factors
and interpreting the charts. Today technical analysis has come to signify a wide range of
information involving the overall sentiment of market analysts and the potential flow of
funds into and out of the market.
The modern technician examines many factors, such as interest rates and Federal
Reserve activity that could be considered part of fundamental analysis. But while the
fundamentalist looks at interest rate and Federal Reserve data to try to determine future
economic conditions, the technician is only concerned with how this information may affect
supply and demand in the market.
Sentiment Indicators
There are many successful fundamentalists who stress the importance of going
against the flow of popular opinion, but technicians, almost to an individual, consider
themselves contrarians. Contrarians believe that the majority of investors become most
optimistic just as the market is poised for a fall, and most pessimistic when it is preparing to
rebound. Technicians attribute this to the safety of conformity and a general lack of ability
to think independently.
The need to seek safety in conformity is cleverly stated by Ralph Wanger, the
manager of the very successful Acorn Fund and a staunch fundamentalist. Wanger compares
portfolio managers to a herd of zebras. Both weigh the desire for higher rewards (the better
grass on the edge of the herd for the zebras) with risk (the increased chance of being eaten by
a lion for the zebra on the edge of the herd). For most portfolio managers, the safest place to
be is in the middle of the herd. As Wanger quotes one portfolio manager, "It really doesn't
matter a lot to me what happens to Johnson & Johnson as long as everyone has it and we all
go down together."
In addition to the need for conformity, technicians believe most investors are simply
slow to accept changing conditions. Martin Pring writes that, "The majority [of investors] is
most pessimistic at market bottoms, at precisely the point when it should be buying." The
cycle of investor sentiment then moves from "pessimism and fear to hope, overconfidence,
and greed ... optimism reaches its peak around the same point that the market is also
reaching its high."
Among the most used contrarian indicators include advisory services, mutual fund
cash ratios, put/call ratios, and short sales. Technicians believe that advisory services and
mutual fund managers as a whole are usually wrong at market peaks and troughs. Therefore,
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the more advisory services reporting bearish forecasts and the higher the overall cash
positions of mutual funds, the more bullish the contrarian will be. Short sales, and the
put/call ratio measure overall investor sentiment. Low levels of short sales, and a low
put/call ratio signal a bullish attitude on the part of investors, which a contrarian sees as a
clear bearish signal.
Not all sentiment indicators are contrarian signals. Some technicians also believe in
"following the smart money." The smart money includes stock exchange specialists, and
insiders who must report there trading activity. Some technicians also view the Barron's
Confidence Index, which measures the difference in yield spreads between high-grade bonds
and ordinary bonds, as a good barometer of future market movements.
Flow-of-Funds Indicators
Since the technician sees supply and demand as the ultimate driver of stock prices,
many technicians try to determine the amount of potential demand. To try and predict future
demand, technicians look at credit balances in brokerage accounts and financial positions of
institutional investors, as well as Federal Reserve activity. Other flow-of-funds indicators
include short interest and margin debt.
A credit balance in a brokerage account results from the sale of stocks. Technicians
assume that money left in a brokerage account will be reinvested soon. With the growing
importance of institutional investors, the financial positions of these investors plays an
increasingly important role in the demand for stocks. The net free reserves of the Federal
Reserve measures the liquidity of the banking system. When this number is rising it is seen
as an expansionary or bullish signal.
The short interest ratio is obtained by dividing the monthly short interest from the
New York Stock Exchange by the average volume per day. As mentioned before, this is
used by many technicians as a contrary opinion indicator. The amount of short interest also
indicates certain demand, since short sellers must eventually cover their positions.
Interest Rates
At first glance interest rates would seem to belong within the realm of fundamental
analysis. After all, interest rates directly affect company profits by providing cheaper funds
and also by increasing the buying ability of consumers. Technicians do not deny this aspect
of interest rates. However, technicians also see the effect interest rates have in influencing
investor decisions.
When interest rates rise faster than dividends, bonds become more attractive than
stocks to investors. This is particularly true in some segments such as utilities which are
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usually purchased for their dividend yield. As interest rates rise, stock prices are believed to
fall until until the value of stocks and bonds is perceived to be roughly equal by investors.
Another aspect of interest rates watched by technicians is the spread between high-
quality and lower-quality bonds. When investors are optimistic they are more likely to
invest in riskier bonds which closes the yield gap between high-grade bonds and poorer-
quality issues. Although some might view this as a contrary opinion sign, the standard belief
is that investors who will invest in riskier bonds will invest in riskier stocks. Many
technicians believe that the bond market normally leads the stock market, so a widening
yield spread between high- and low-grade bonds is seen as a bearish signal.
As mentioned earlier, the lines between technical and fundamental analysis are often
blurred. Practically every investor uses stock charts in some form to track the performance
of stocks and markets. While they may not get out a ruler to draw lines connecting price
peaks, it would be naive to believe that a glance at a dramatic upward trend did not have
some effect on a fundamentalist investor.
Today some investors are integrating aspects of technical analysis into their
fundamental analysis. Often this means looking at technical indicators to assess the overall
market while using fundamental analysis to look at individual securities. The wider
availability of technical indicators and the use of computerized trading systems have also
contributed to the expanded use of technical analysis.
Applying Technical Analysis
At this point, it would seem a few simple tests of the methods of technical analysis
would be in order. For our purposes, we will focus on applying some of the less ambiguous
indicators as applied to the S&P 500 composite index. The S&P 500 includes 400 industrial
issues, 40 utilities, 40 financial issues, and 20 transportation issues. The S&P 500 represents
a cross section of stocks average risk and average growth prospects and is often used to
represent the market as a whole.
Although trendlines are a key element of technical analysis, they are extremely
subjective and therefore difficult to test. It is especially doubtful that any meaningful test
could be done using historic information, as judgement decisions would be clouded by the
knowledge of the future direction {>ricesactually took. Drawing trendlines is defmitely more
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The above chart shows the S&P 500 from 1983 to June of 1993. All tests will be
conducted on the ten year time period from July 1, 1983 to June 30, 1993. During this time
the S&P 500 index grew from 168.91 to 450.53, an increase of 167%. As an annualized
compound rate over ten years, this represents a 10.31% annual return. The results of returns
generated from technical strategies, will be compared to this return. Transaction costs will
not be considered in these tests, although these costs can be significant, especially when
compared to a buy an hold strategy which would have practically no transaction costs.
As mentioned before, the S&P 500 index represents an extremely broad market
indicator. It would be practically impossible and prohibitively expensive to purchase every
stock included in the index immediately upon every buy or sell signal generated by a system.
There are however, mutual funds designed to emulate the S&P 500 and one can also
purchase futures contracts on the index, so there is some practical use for initiating buy and
sell signals for the S&P 500.
The ISO-Day Moving Average
The moving average has become one of the most common technical tools and can be
used to establish concrete trading rules which can be easily measured. We will examine
several sets of rules, each applied to a I50-day moving average line computed over the ten
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Figure 11. S&P 500 with 150-daymovingaverage.
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The first use of a moving average line involves simply identifying any moment when
the price is above the line as a bullish signal and times when the price is below the moving
average are seen as bearish. Thus a buy signal is indicated by the price breaking through the
line from below, and a sell signal is indicated when the price falls below the line. It is
assumed that the index could be sold or bought at the closing price on the day that the
moving average line is broken.
We are assumed to buy the index on 7/1/83 at 168.91 and sell the index on 6/30/93 at
450.53. In between, the above rules generate 36 buy and 36 sell signals. Because of the
nature of the moving average line, some signals are reversed after only one or two days.
These "whipsaws" will always result in selling at a lower price than was just paid, or buying
at a higher price than that at which the index was just sold. At other times buy or sell signals
are not generated for long periods of time. After the buy signal on 11/28/89, the line is not
crossed again until 1/12/90.
A chart of the complete ten-year period is shown in Figure 11 below. As seen,
moving average crossovers will never indicate a market top or bottom. In fact, by there very
nature, they do not allow an investor to sell before or buy before a market peak. They do














The signals generated from breakthroughs of a simple moving average would have
outperformed a buy and hold strategy over the last ten years. By buying the index on buy
signals and being completely out of the market on sell signals an investor would have held
the index for 2761 days and seen an increase of 240.46 points or 142% over the original
investment. Converted to an annual yield, this represents 12.24% annually compared to the
10.31% annual return from a buy and hold strategy. Of course, one's actual return would
depend on how funds were invested while out of the market after sell signals.
One interesting aspect of this test is the fact that only 13 out of 36 buy signals
resulted in gains before the next sell signal. However, the gains were much larger than the
23 losses, averaging over 9% compared to the average loss of less than 1%. A detailed
description of each buy signal and the result until the next sell signal is presented in Chart 1
in the appendix.
As previously mentioned, several signals were reversed after only one day. The test
was also run with signals being generated if the price moved through the moving average
line and stayed at least one additional day. With this new trading rule only 22 buy and sell
signals were issued, 14 less than the first test. Although this did eliminate most of the very
short-term positions, and would have saved on transaction costs, it actually lowered the
annual return.
By delaying decisions one day an investor would have owned the index a total of 5
more days, but would have realized a gain of 223.74 points as compared to 240.46 in the
original test. The annual return would have been 11.60% with this strategy, still above the
buy and hold strategy, but below the 12.24% from the first test. All of these results are
shown in Chart 2.
One more condition was added to the moving average test with dramatic results.
There are times when it is assumed that a price is so far above or below its moving average,
that it must return in that direction. After trying several limits, the best results were found
from sell orders at 15% above the moving average and buy signals from a price 15% below
the moving average. These continued until the price moved back to within 5% from the
moving average. All other conditions remained the same.
These new conditions resulted in just 4 more transactions, but greatly increased.
return as shown in Chart 3. Total days owning the index decreased to 2560 frOftlacIt
.
originally. However the total gain increased from 240 to 286, and the IDDual_
14.97%, more than 2.5% above the original test and almost 5% better than a buy .'
strategy.
'y It,."
The moving average was also tested with the hypothetical. inve8tOr
either long or short the S&P 500. Instead of simply being out of the market 'after a aeII
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signal, the investor would short the index until the next buy signal. This was the least
successful test with the moving average, and the only one that resulted in a lower return than
the buy and hold strategy. Despite a nice additional gain during the market collapse of
October, 1987, this strategy only resulted in an 8.10% annual return.
Bond Yields
Another simple indicator that performed very well over the last ten years was the
direction of average yields of 20 Dow-Jones bonds. This figure is readily available and
reported on a weekly basis. The trend proved more important than the actual yield level in
predicting stock market movement over the last ten years.
Several tests were conducted using instances of three or five moves in the same
direction as well as examining moves of a certain size. Prices were then examined one
week, one month, three months and six months in the future (see Chart 4). Theoretically,
falling rates should be a bullish sign and rising rates bearish.
There were 16 occurrences of rates falling three consecutive weeks by at least 2% of
the original yield. The average price change of the S&P 500 one week after the third
consecutive week was +.53%. Compounded annually, this is a 31.64% rate of return. On
the 13 occasions when yields rose three consecutive weeks by at least 2%, the next week's
S&P 500 averaged a 2.03% decline. Results over longer periods showed inconclusive
results, however. Six months after yields rose saw a higher increase than six months after
they fell.
The best results were generated by using a lO-week moving average of the average
bond yields. When this moving average began falling a buy signal resulted, and when the
average started up the index was sold. This method resulted in 15 buy signals over the ten-
year period and a gain of nearly 271 points from holding the index 2233 days as shown in
Chart 5. The annual return was 16.90%, well above the buy and hold result of 10.31%.
Other Indicators
The short interest ratio is used by many technicians, but is changing very rapidly.
According to a respected technician, Ned Davis, writing in 1986, a ratio above 1.65 is
considered bullish and below 1.25 is considered bearish. From the early 1960s to the early
1980s the short interest ratio stayed close to these limits. However in 1983 it moved above
2.00 and from 1989 to 1993 has stayed between 2.97 and 5.77.
Obviously the relevance of the short interest ratio is changing rapidly. It may be
applied over shorter time spans, but it made little sense to use as an indicator over a ten-year
period when the indicator itself was changing so much more than any price pattern.
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The confidence index divides the average yield of high grade bonds by the average
yield of intermediate grade bonds. The lower the number, the higher the premium required
to induce investors to purchase more speculative bonds. Over the last ten years, it seemed
that the confidence gave a bearish signal when under 92 and a bullish signal over 96.
Between these two numbers could only be considered neutral.
The over 96 bullish indicator was fairly reliable, but the market actually increased
more while the confidence index was below 92. There were only three periods totaling less
than a year when the index stayed below 92 and four when it was over 96 which totaled just
over one year. The rest of the time it stayed in the neutral range. Despite being in the
neutral range about 80% of the time, The S&P 500 increased 126.09 points while the
confidence index was either bullish or bearish, and only rose 155.53 points while the
indicator was neutral. The details are presented in Chart 6 in the appendix.
Combining Indicators
Most technicians combine a number of different indicators to guide their decisions.
Deciding which indicators to use and how much weight to give each one is often a difficult
process. Technicians tend to have a "use whatever works" attitude, but are also quick to
change systems if one is not working.
Combining indicators tends to create fewer transactions, since several indicators must
agree before a signal will be given. By combining the direction the I50-day moving average
is moving, whether the price is above or below the moving average, Whether it is too far
from the average, the direction of the average bond yield rate, and the confidence index we
can create a system that requires a degree of confirmation from the different indicators. All
of these tools have been demonstrated on their own in the previous sections.
In our system we will assign 1 point if the moving average is moving upward and 0 if
it is moving downward. Likewise, we will assign 1 point if the price is above the moving
average and 0 if below. To make sure the price does not move too far from the average, we
will assign 1 point if the price is more than 10% below the moving average, -1 if it is more
than 10% above the average, and 0 when it is between these points. We will utilize the
moving average of the average bond yield as before. Now we will assign 1 point when it is
moving lower, and -1 when moving upward. The confidence index will generate 1 point
when over 96, -1 when under 92 and 0 points when between these extremes.
This system gives a possible high score of 5 and a maximum low of -3. A score of 2
or more is considered bullish and a buy signal. A score below 0 is bearish and considered 8
sell signal. Scores of 3 or 4 can be considered very bullish, and 0 and 1 are neutral.
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When this system is applied to the S&P 500 over the last ten years, it generates only
five buy and se\1 signals. These are shown in the chart below in Figure 12. Arrows pointing
up represent the buy signals, and down pointing arrows are sell signals.
Since the majority of indicators must agree to signal a change, we expect few
transactions. The details of these transactions are presented in Chart 7 in the appendix.
After the original buy signal results in a minor loss, the others each post healthy gains. The
S&P index is held for a much longer time under this set of rules than in the previous
examples. If sold on the last day of the test, this trading system would have resulted in a
13.69% annual yield. This does again outperform a buy and hold strategy, but does not







Figure 12. S&P 500 with buy and sell signals.
Conclusions
We must be careful not to infer too much from the fact that some technical trading
rules outperformed the S&P 500. All that this means is that they did outperform a buy and
hold strategy over the last ten years. Whether the same rules will work next year will only
be known after next year. This presents one of the major problems with technical analysis
- even if it does work we can not explain why. Technicians seem to be prone to launching
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into long explanations of the intricacies of investor behavior to try and justify why a trading
rule worked. Rare is the investor who is able to strongly believe in something they cannot
explain.
Yet these simple trading rules explored in this paper do seem to have some benefit.
Three of the rules performed significantly better than the market over a meaningful sample
period. There are no statistically valid methods to attribute this excess return to random
chance.
No matter how many tests are run, the debate over the effectiveness of technical
analysis will continue. There will continue to be fundamentalists who make money
investing and lose money investing. And there will be some technicians who actually make
money investing, and not just from selling advice books and newsletters.
Technical analysis is not just a short cut to avoid actually analyzing a stock. The new
breed of technicians have exceptionally strong theoretical mathematics backgrounds and
often enter investing from engineering or computer science fields. Successful technicians
spend long hours doing tedious calculations and expanding on statistical concepts.
Still, the fact remains that no one has absolutely proven that a technical system will
consistently outperform the market. This paper presents several very simple tools that would
have outperformed the market over a certain time period. Until it is proven that these
methods will not work in the future, many analysts will continue to profitably use them.
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buy triggered by upward breakthrough
sell triggered by downward breakthrough
Buy Signal Buy Sell Signal Sell % AnnualizedDate Price Date Price Gain/loss Gain/loss Yield
7/1/83 168.91 10/28/83 163.37
-5.54
-3.28%
-9.60%11/2/83 166.09 11/3/83 163.45
-2.64
-1.59%
-99.69%11/11/83 166.29 11/17/83 165.09
-1.2
-0.72%
-35.24%11/21/83 166.05 12/2/83 165.44
-0.61
-0.37%
-11.35%12/5/83 165.77 12/6/83 165.47
-0.3
-0.18%
-47.90%12/7/83 165.91 12/8/83 165.20
-0.71
-0.43%
-78.65%1/4/84 166.78 1/23/84 164.87
-1.91
-1.15%
-19.61%1/24/84 165.94 1/25/84 164.84
-1.1
-0.66%
-90.88%8/2/84 157.99 9/11/85 185.03 27.04 17.12% 15.08%10/14/85 186.37 9/11/86 235.18 48.81 26.19% 28.69%10/29/86 240.94 11/18/86 236.78
-4.16
-1.73%
-26.91 %11/20/86 242.05 12/31/86 242.17 0.12 0.05% 0.44%1/2/87 246.45 10/14/87 305.23 58.78 23.85% 31.02%3/18/88 271 . 12 3/21/88 268.74
-2.38
-0.88%
-65.29%4/6/88 265.49 4/14/88 259.75
-5.74
-2.16%
-62.60%4/25/88 262.46 5/11/88 253.31
-9.15
-3.49%
-55.00%5/13/88 256.78 5/18/88 251.35
-5.43
-2.11 %
-78.54%5/25/88 253.76 5/27/88 253.42
-0.34
-0.13%
-21.44%5/31/88 262.16 8/10/88 261.90
-0.26
-0.10%
-0.50%8/1 1/88 262.75 8/12/88 262.55
-0.2
-0.08%
-23.98%9/2/88 264.48 11/16/88 263.82
-0.66
-0.25%
-1.19%11/23/88 269.00 11/25/88 267.23
-1.77
-0.66%
-69.53%11/28/88 268.64 1/12/90 339.93 71.29 26.54% 22.96%3/19/90 343.53 3/20/90 341.57
-1.96
-0.57%
-87.25%4/3/90 343.64 4/4/90 341.09
-2.55
-0.74%
-93.15%4/10/90 342.07 4/18/90 340.72
-1.35
-0.39%
-16.30%517/90 340.53 8/3/90 344.86 4.33 1.27% 5.30%1/17/91 327.97 10/7/91 379.50 51.53 15.71% 22.11%10/11/91 381.45 11/15/91 382.62 1.17 0.31% 3.20%11/18/91 385.24 11/19/91 379.42
-5.82
-1.51%
-99.58%12/13/91 388.47 12/17/91 382.74
-5.73
-1.48%
-73.75%12/20/91 387.04 4/8/92 394.50 7.46 1.93% 6.45%4/9/92 400.64 6/17/92 402.26 1.62 0.40% 2.13%6/29/92 408.94 8/24/92 410.72 1.78 0.44% 2.83%8/26/92 413.51 10/2/92 410.47
-3.04
-0.74%
-6.93%10/19/92 414.98 4/26/93 433.54 18.56 4.47% 8.69%4/27/93 438.01 6/30/93 450.53 12.52 2.86% 17.18%
Total Days Held: 2761 240.46 142.36% 12.24%
Chart 1.
150-day Moving Average
sell triggered by second day under average after breakthrough
buy triggered by second day over average after breakthrough
Buy Signal Buy Sell Signal Sell % AnnualizedDate Price Date Price Gain/Loss Gain/Loss Yield
7/1/83 168.91 10/31/83 163.55
-5.36
-3.17%
-9.08%11/14/83 166.58 11/18/83 165.09
-1.49
-0.89%
-55.45%11/22/83 166.84 12/9/83 165.09
-1.75
-1.05%
-20.01 %1/5/84 168.81 1/26/84 162.51
-6.3
-3.73%
-47.90%8/3/84 162.35 9/12/85 183.69 21.34 13.14% 11.60%10/15/85 186.08 9/12/86 230.67 44.59 23.96% 26.23%10/30/86 243.71 11/19/86 237.66
-6.05
-2.48%
-36.40%11/21/86 245.86 10/15/87 298.08 52.22 21.24% 23.54%4/7/88 266.16 4/15/88 259.77
-6.39
-2.40%
-66.50%4/26/88 263.93 5/12/88 253.85
-10.08
-3.82%
-58.36%5/16/88 258.71 5/19/88 252.57
-6.14
-2.37%
-94.40%5/26/88 254.63 8/15/88 258.69 4.06 1.59% 7.28%9/6/88 265.59 11/17/88 264.6
-0.99
-0.37%
-1.85%11/29/88 270.91 1/15/90 349.18 78.27 28.89% 24.83%4/11/90 341.92 4/18/90 341.09
-0.83
-0.24%
-11.75%5/8/90 342.01 8/6/90 334.43
-7.58
-2.22%
-8.57%1/18/91 332.23 10/8/91 380.67 48.44 14.58% 20.48%10/14/91 386.47 11/20/91 378.53
-7.94
-2.05%
-18.29%12/16/91 384.46 12/18/91 383.48
-0.98
-0.25%
-36.83%12/23/91 396.82 6/18/92 400.96 4.14 1.04% 2.12%6/30/92 408.14 8/25/92 411.61 3.47 0.85% 5.59%8/27/92 413.53 10/5/92 407.57
-5.96
-1.44%
-12.54%10/20/92 415.48 6/30/93 450.53 35.05 8.44% 12.21%
Total Holding Days
= 2766 223.74 132.46% 11.60%
Chart 2.
1So-day Moving Average
Buy when upward break of MA or when < -15% from MA
Sell when downward break of MA or when > 15% above MA
Buy Signal Buy Price Sell Signal Sell Price % AnnualizedDate Date Gain/Loss Gain/Loss Yield
7/1/83 168.91 10/28/83 163.37
-5.54
-3.28%
-9.60%11/2/83 166.09 11/3/83 163.45
-2.64
-1.59%
-99.69%11/11/83 166.29 11/17/83 165.09
-1.2
-0.72%
-35.24%11/21/83 166.05 12/2/83 165.44
-0.61
-0.37%
-11.35%12/5/83 165.77 12/6/83 165.47
-0.3
-0.18%
-47.90%12/7/83 165.91 12/8/83 165.20
-0.71
-0.43%
-78.65%1/4/84 166.78 1/23/84 164.87
-1.91
-1.15%
-19.61%1/24/84 165.94 1/25/84 164.84
-1.1
-0.66%
-90.88%8/2/84 157.99 9/11/85 185.03 27.04 17.12% 15.08%10/14/85 186.37 3/11/86 231.69 45.32 24.32% 69.80%7/14/86 238.11 9/11/86 235.18
-2.93
-1.23%
-7.28%10/29/86 240.94 11/18/86 236.78
-4.16
-1.73%
-26.91%11/20/86 242.05 12/31/86 242.17 0.12 0.05% 0.44%1/2/87 246.45 2/17 /87 285.49 39.04 15.84% 216.08%5/19/87 279.62 10/14/87 305.23 25.61 9.16% 23.76%10/19/87 224.84 2/22/88 265.64 40.8 18.15% 61.03%3/18/88 271.12 3/21/88 268.74
-2.38
-0.88%
-65.29%4/6/88 265.49 4/14/88 259.75
-5.74
-2.16%
-62.60%4/25/88 262.46 5/11/88 253.31
-9.15
-3.49%
-55.00%5/13/88 256.78 5/18/88 251.35
-5.43
-2.11 %
-78.54%5/25/88 253.76 5/27/88 253.42
-0.34
-0.13%
-21.44%5/31/88 262.16 8/10/88 261.90
-0.26
-0.10%
-0.50%8/11/88 262.75 8/12/88 262.55
-0.2
-0.08%
-23.98%9/2/88 264.48 11/16/88 263.82
-0.66
-0.25%
-1.19%11/23/88 269.00 11/25/88 267.23
-1.77
-0.66%
-69.53%11/28/88 268.64 1/12/90 339.93 71.29 26.54% 22.96%3/19/90 343.53 3/20/90 341.57
-1.96
-0.57%
-87.25%4/3/90 343.64 4/4/90 341.09
-2.55
-0.74%
-93.15%4/10/90 342.07 4/18/90 340.72
-1.35
-0.39%
-16.30%5/7/90 340.53 8/3/90 344.86 4.33 1.27% 5.30%1/17/91 327.97 3/5/91 376.72 48.75 14.86% 189.06%6/24/91 370.94 10/7/91 379.50 8.56 2.31% 8.14%10/11/91 381.45 11/15/91 382.62 1.17 0.31% 3.20%11/18/91 385.24 11/19/91 379.42
-5.82
-1.51%
-99.58%12/13/91 388.47 12/17/91 382.74
-5.73
-1.48%
-73.75%12/20/91 387.04 4/8/92 394.50 7.46 1.93% 6.45%4/9/92 400.64 6/17/92 402.26 1.62 0.40% 2.13%6/29/92 408.94 8/24/92 410.72 1.78 0.44% 2.83%8/26/92 413.51 10/2/92 410.47
-3.04
-0.74%
-6.93%10/19/92 414.98 4/26/93 433.54 18.56 4.47% 8.69%4/27/93 438.01 6/30/93 450.53 12.52 2.86% 17.18%
Total Holding Days
= 2560 286.49 169.61% 14.97%
Chart 3
Average Bond Yield Movement
Results after three consecutive upward yield moves
Date of 3rd % rate s&P 500 1 week S&P 500 s&P 500 s&P 500 1-wk 1-mth 3-mth 6-mthconsecutive + change on date later 1 month 3 months 6 months change change change change




-5.45%5/23/84 4.06% 153.15 150.35 153.97 167.12 166.92
-1.83% 0.54% 9.12% 8.99%7/5/84 2.72% 152.76 150.56 162.60 162.68 162.10
-1.44% 6.44% 6.49% 6.11%3/5/85 2.97% 180.65 179.66 178.03 190.16 187.27
-0.55%
-1 .45% 5.26% 3.66%10/9/85 2.01% 182.52 187.98 197.28 206.11 233.75 2.99% 8.09% 12.92% 28.07%6/4/86 3.27% 243.94 241 .13 244.05 253.83 253.04
-1.15% 0.05% 4.05% 3.73%7/30/86 4.01% 236.59 236.84 248.52 243.71 274.08 0.11% 5.04% 3.01% 15.85%5/27/87 4.36% 288.73 293.47 307.90 310.65 240.34 1.64% 6.64% 7.59%




-14.90%4/13/88 3.15% 271.57 256.13 256.78 269.32 275.22
-5.69%
-5.45%
-0.83% 1.34%4/5/89 2.40% 296.24 298.99 307.61 320.64 356.97 0.93% 3.84% 8.24% 20.50%6/26/91 4.21% 371.59 373.33 380.93 386.49 404.84 0.47% 2.51% 4.01% 8.95%
Average
= -2.03% 0.46% 3.64% 5.66%
% declines 58.33% 33.33% 25.00% 25.00%
Average Bond Yield Movement
Results after three consecutive downward yield moves
Date of 3rd % rate s&P 500 1week 1 month 3 months 6 months 1-wk 1-mth 3-mth 6-mthconsecutive
-
change on date later change change change change
1/30/84




-2.01% 148.83 154.08 166.44 166.31 177.35 3.53% 11.83% 11.74% 19.16%9/5/84
-2.08% 164.29 164.68 162.68 162.10 180.65 0.24%
-0.98%
-1.33% 9.96%10/24/84
-3.42% 167.20 166.84 165.55 176.71 182.26
-0.22%
-0.99% 5.69% 9.01%4/10/85
-2.00% 179.42 181.68 184.28 192.37 182.78 1.26% 2.71% 7.22% 1.87%5/15/85
-2.63% 184.54 188.56 186.53 187.26 198.11 2.18% 1.08% 1.47% 7.35%9/3/86
-5.02% 250.08 247.06 233.71 253.85 284.12
-1.21%
-6.55% 1.51% 13.61%7/1187
-2.99% 304.92 308.29 317.57 327.33 255.94 1.11% 4.15% 7.35%
-16.06%11/11/87
-5.16% 241 .90 245.55 235.32 255.95 253.31 1.51%
-2.72% 5.81% 4.72%2/10/88
-5.91% 256.66 259.21 263.84 257.62 261.90 0.99% 2.80% 0.37% 2.04%2/1/89
-2.29% 297.09 298.65 287.11 309.12 343.75 0.53%
-3.36% 4.05% 15.71 %6/14/89
-5.63% 323.83 320.48 331.84 343.16 350.93
-1.03% 2.47% 5.97% 8.37%5/30/90




-2.07% 390.56 389.90 384.56 393.72 411.09
-0.17%
-1.54% 0.81% 5.26%6/24/92
-2.21% 403.83 412.88 411.60 418.47 439.77 2.24% 1.92% 3.63% 8.90%9/16/92
-5.43% 419.92 417.44 411.73 431.52 451.37
-0.59%
-1.95% 2.76% 7:49"-
Average= 0.53% 0.35% 2.73% 4.93%
Chart 4.
Moving Average of Bond Yields
buy signal when moving average moves up
sell signal when moving average moves down
Days Buy Signal Sell Signal % AnnualizedHeld Date Price Date Price GainILoss GainILoss Yield
35 10/1/83 165.8 11/5/83 161.91
-3.89
-2.35%
-21.67%217 8/1/84 154.08 3/6/85 180.65 26.57 17.24% 30.20%399 5/1/85 178.37 6/4/86 243.94 65.57 36.76% 32.64%
28 8/20/86 249.77 9/17/86 231.68
-18.09
-7.24%
-61.96%21 10/15/86 238.8 11/5/86 246.58 7.78 3.26% 73.26%126 12/3/86 253.85 4/8/87 297.26 43.41 17.10% 56.99%
21 8/5/87 318.45 8/26/87 334.57 16.12 5.06% 133.15%
140 11/25/87 244.1 4/13/88 271.57 27.47 11 .25% 31.55%35 10/26/88 281.38 11/30/88 278.97
-2.41 -0.86%
-8.47%35 1/25/89 289.14 3/1189 287.11
-2.03
-0.70% -6.99%
147 5/10/89 305.8 10/4/89 356.94 51.14 16.72% 46.04%63 11/22/89 341.91 1/24/90 330.26
-11 .65 -3.41%
-17.97%
70 6/27/90 355.14 9/5/90 324.39
-30.75 -8.66%
-37.23%203 12/5/90 329.92 6/26/91 371.59 41.67 12.63% 23.48%693 8/7/91 390.56 6/30/93 450.53 59.97 15.35% 7.70%
Total Holding Days
=
2233 270.88 163.38% 16.90%
Chart 5.
Confidence Index
Bearish <92 Neutral 96< Bullish
% AnnualizedPosition Date Price Date Price Gain/Loss Gain/Loss Yield
Bearish 7/1/83 168.91 10/24/84 167.2
-1.71 -1.01% -0.76%Neutral 10/24/84 167.2 2/12/86 215.97 48.77 29.17% 21.36%Bearish 2/12/86 215.97 6/4/86 243.94 27.97 12.95% 47.91 %Neutral 6/4/86 243.94 12/10/86 250.96 7.02 2.88% 5.55%Bearish 12/10/86 250.96 2/25/87 284 33.04 13.17% 78.29%
Neutral 2/25/87 284 8/31/88 261.52
-22.48 -7.92% -5.23%Bullish 8/31/88 261.52 11/2/88 279.06 17.54 6.71% 44.91%Neutral 11/2/88 279.06 3/15/89 296.67 17.61 6.31% 18.01 %
Bullish 3/15/89 296.67 5/31/89 320.52 23.85 8.04% 43.55%Neutral 5/31/89 320.52 2/21/90 327.67 7.15 2.23% 3.03%
Bullish 2/21/90 327.67 7/11/90 361.23 33.56 10.24% 28.50%Neutral 7/11/90 361.23 8/29/90 324.19
-37.04 -10.25% -54.83%Bullish 8/29/90 324.19 11/21/90 316.03
-8.16 -2.52% -10.35%Neutral 11/21/90 316.03 6/30/93 450.53 134.5 42.56% 14.35%
Bullish Average Ann. Yld. 26.65%
Bearish Average Ann. Yld. 41.81%
Neutral Average Ann. Yld. 0.32%
Chart 6
% Annualized
Buy Signal Sell Signal Gain/Loss Gain/Loss Return
Date Date
9/30/83 166.07 12/2/83 165.44 -0.63 -0.38% -2.15%
8/31/84 166.68 10/16/87 282.7 116.02 69.61% 18.14%
12/4/87 223.92 4/22/88 260.14 36.22 16.18% 47.04%
9/2/88 264.48 11/30/90 322.22 57.74 21.83% 9.07%
1/18/91 332.23 6/30/93 450.53 118.3 35.61% 13.05%
Factors: 150-day moving average moving up: 1
150-day moving average moving down: 0
Price above moving average: 1
Price below moving average: 0
Price < 10% below moving average: 1
Price> 10% above moving average: -1
Average bond yield moving average moving down:
Average bond yield moving average moving up: -1
Confidence index > 96: 1
Confidence index < 92: -1
Buy indicated if total of all factors => 2
Sell indicated if total of all factors =< -1
Total days held: 3057 327.65 197.30% 13.69%
Chart 7.
